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CASE NOTES

CASE NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW-DUE

PROCESS OF LAW-HEARING.-In

a pro-

ceeding to deport an alien, the warrant on which he was arrested was
not shown or read to him. He was not advised of his right to counsel
until his examination was in progress, when it was adjourned to give
him an opportunity to employ counsel. Held, the alien obtained a fair
hearing although the warrant was not read to him if the charges were
correctly stated to him. If the court is adjourned to give him an
opportunity to employ counsel, which he declined to do, it does not
render the hearing unfair. Seif v. Nagle, 14 F. (2d) 416.
There is a difference as to what is a fair hearing when the hearing
is one in which the alien is seeking admission or if it is a hearing concerning the deportation of an alien. "Congress has the complete and
absolute power over immigration", Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranaham, 214 U. S. 320. "An alien should be regarded as if he had been
stopped and kept at the limit of our jurisdiction", U. S. v. Ju Toy,
198, U. S.253. Since an alien is regarded as stopped at the entrance
he is not within the jurisdiction of the United States and the "due
process of law" clause of the United States Constitution does not apply
to him. Congress may provide for any kind of hearing that it sees
fit without violating the "due process" clause. After an alien has been
admitted to the United States he is entitled to a fair hearing. "An
alien, as well as a citizen, is protected by the prohibition of deprivation
of life, liberty or property without due process and the equal protection of the law" Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745. The case cited
above states that all parties must be fully apprised of the
evidence submitted or to be considered, and must be given opportunity
to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents, and to offer evidence
is explanation or rebuttal. The above case is quoted with approval in
the case of Hays v. Sesto, 12 F. (2d) 698. "Indispensable requisites of
a fair hearing, are that the proceedings shall be appropriate to the
case and just to the party affected; that the accused shall be notified
of the nature of the charge against him in time to meet it; that he
shall have such an opportunity to be heard that he may, if he chooses,
cross-examine the witnesses against him; that he may have time and
opportunity, after all the evidence against him is produced and known
to him, to produce evidence and witnesses to refute it; that the decision shall be governed by and based upon the evidence at the hearing, and that only; and that the decision shall not be without substantial evidence taken at the trial to support it." Thus we see that an
alien is entitled to a fair hearing in deportation proceedings.
WALTER 0. BURK.
-0BOUNDARIES-GOVERNMENT CORNERS-CONCLUSIVENEsS.-In
action
for township's moving road over on land claimed by plaintiff by virtue of original corner stake, since obliterated, plaintiff introduced evidence showing that the obliterated stake marked the true corner of
the government survey. The former owner of the plaintiff's land testified that he saw the survey mounds and stakes at the two corners of
the land over 40 years ago, and that he established the road between
the two mounds while the markings were still fresh. The defendant
township showed by a resurvey that this was not the true corner.
Held, that the original monument, if found or established, marks the
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true corner, though a resurvey might indicate a different location.
Lawson v. Viola Tp. 21o N. W. 979 (S. D. 1926).

A distinction is made between an "obliterated corner" and a "lost
corner." An obliterated comer is one where no visible evidence remains of the work of the original surveyor in establishing it. A lost
corner is one the position of which cannot be determined beyond reasonable doubt, or from original monuments, or reliable external evidence. Fellows v. Willett, 98 Okl. 248, 224, Pac. 298. A lost corner may
be established by a new survey in which courses and distances shown on
the plat and field notes furnish a guide. Sommer v. Meyer, 125 Minn.
258, 146 N. W. IIo6;Washington Rock Co. v. Young, 29 Utah io8,
8o Pac. 382. But original comers, as established by the government
sqrveyors, if they can be found, or the places where they were originally established, if they can be definitely determined, are conclusive
on all persons owning or holding with reference thereto, Barringerv.
Davis, 141 Iowa 419, 12o N. W. 65, without regard to whether they
were located correctly or not, Byrne v. McKeachie, 34 S. D. 589, 149
N. W.

552;

Anderson v. Johanesen, 155 Minn. 485, 193 N. W. 730;

Fellows v. Willett, supra,, and must remain the true comers or monuments by which to determine the boundaries. Trinwith v. Smith, 42 Or.
239, 70 Pac. 816. Thus, the point where a section post or quarter
section post is placed on the ground, if satisfactorily established, is
controling and conclusive though not according with courses and distances. Lawler v. Rice County et al, 147 Minn. 461, 18o N. W. 37;
Halley v. Harriman, io6 Neb. 377, 183 N. W. 665. If the point or
corner cannot be satisfactorily established, and it may be fixed with
reasonable certainty by using the field notes of the government surveyor, such location will be adopted. Weaver v. Howatt, 171, Cal. 302,
152 Pac. 925.
Where the monument is obliterated the court cannot
presume, for instance, from the fences and trees alone, that the same
were placed in accordance with the monuments. Pine v. Reynolds, 187
Iowa 379, 174 N. W. 257. The fact that the location will alter the
shapes of the sections and the subdivisions thereby does not affect the
conclusiveness of the survey. Weaver v. Howatt, supra.
LEONARD A. W. STEPHAN.
-0CONFLICT OF LAWS-DIVORCE-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT.-A and B,
married parties, met in New York City and decided to marry each
other upon securing divorces from their respective spouses. They repaired to Colorado for that purpose. Under the laws of Colorado, no
person was entitled to a divorce unless such person had been a bona fide
resident and citizen of the state for one year prior to the commencement of the divorce suit. A, after living in Colorado for one month,
brought suit for divorce from her husband, who lived in England;
notice being by publication only and he not appearing. The divorce
was granted. B, after a residence of one year, filed suit against his
wife who lived in New York. Service of notice was made by publication and the wife not appearing, his divorce was granted. A and B
went to St. Louis, Mo., and were there married. This present suit
for divorce is brought by A in the District of Columbia, B being the
respondent. Held, that the divorces procured by the respective parties in Colorado, should not be and are not, recognized as valid divorces
by the courts of the District of Columbia. Friedenwaldv. Friedenwald,

16 Fed. (2d.) 5o9.
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Where one spouse goes to a state other than that of the matrimonial domicile and there obtains a divorce under a residence simulated for that purpose, and not in good faith, the judgment is not
binding upon the courts of the other states. Andrews v. Andrews, 188
U. S. 14. A decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony, obtained
in the State of North Dakota, in which neither party is domiciled,
upon service by publication and in another state, is entitled to no faith
and credit in the latter state. Streitwolf v. Streitwolf, I8I U. S. 179,
21 Sup. Ct. 553, 45 L. Ed. 807. By the better view, the judgment or
decree of a court of general jurisdiction in a sister state should not be
held void on the ground that such court was deceived and misled as to
the existence of jurisdictional facts and assumed to exercise jurisdiction when it had no right to do so, unless the evidence is of such
satisfactory character as to exclude any other reasonable conclusion.
Knowlton v. Knowlton, 155 Ill. 158, 39 N. E. 595. Where libellant is,
an actual resident of that state when the action is commenced, the
judgment is valid, and stands on the same footing as any other judgment procured by false testimony. Thurston v. Thurston, 58 Minn.
279, 59 N. W. 1017. This view, if universally followed would be
most conducive to harmony between the various state courts and very
beneficial to the general public. As long as a judgment remains unimpeached in the state in which it was given, it should be accorded
the full faith and credit that it is entitled to. This would obviate the
anomalous situation of a man being single in one state and married in
another; a law abiding citizen in one state and a bigamist in another.
However, the modern trend of the courts seems to be the other way.
A judgment of divorce granted in another state may be collaterally attacked by showing that the court which granted it was without
jurisdiction even though jurisdictional facts are recited in the judgment. Steinbroner v. Steinbroner, 30 Cal. App. 673, 159 Pac. 235.
It.is generally held by the courts that residence in the state for the
prescribed time before commencing an action for a divorce is jurisdictional. Graham v. Graham, 9 N. D. 88, 81 N. W. 44. It has been
held that, if the party is actually a resident of the sister state at the
time he commences the action, although he has not resided in that
state as long as its laws require before commencing the action, the
judgment is valid, although irregular, and hence is binding in a collateral suit. Kern v. Field, 68 Minn. 317, 71 N. W. 393. The word
"residence" as used in divorce statutes should be construed as equivalent to "domicile". Smith v. Smith, io N. D. 219, 86 N. W. 721.
No pretended residence nor temporary visits, nor actual bodily presence
simply nor a sojourn here for business purposes, as an incident to
further his plans for divorce, will suffice. He must have abandoned
his home and must have actually established one here with the purpose of permanently retaining it. Id.
JUD SON MAYER.
-0
OF
PROVISIONS-IMPOSSIBILITY
CONTRACTS-ALTERNATIVE
MANCE OF ONE PROvISIN.-The Yankton Sioux Tribe of

PERFOR-

Indians,

plaintiffs, ceded to the United States valuable lands, for which part
consideration was congressional provision of speedy reference of disputed claims to other lands to the Supreme Court, with the alternative, in case of failure to speedily refer the claims as promised, of a
waiver by the United States of all claims to the other land and a
transfer of it in fee to the Indians. Held, reversing the decision
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of the Court of Claims, that where promises are in the alternative, the
fact that one of them is at the time, or subsequently becomes impossible of performance does not, at least without more, relieve the
promisor from performing the other. Yankton Sioux Tribe of Indians
v. United States, 47 Supreme Court Reporter 142 (1926).
It is a well known and generally accepted rule of law that where
a contract provides that one of two alternatives shall be performed by
the promisor, the fact that one alternative is, or becomes, impossible,
does not excuse the promisor from performing that which remains
possible. I-rvine v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 26 Cal. App. 840, 173 Pac.
487. So it has been held that where adjacent land owners agreed
each to construct and maintain certain portions of a drain, one of
them was liable for failure to perform his part of the contract, although the work could not be done, because of the insufficiency of an
outlet for the water where such outlet was on his land and could have
been readily enlarged. Britten v. Dunning, 55 Mich. 158, 20 N. W. 883.
So too, where no express or implied provision, as to the event of impossibility of performance can be found in the terms or circumstances of
an agreement, it is a general rule of construction, founded on the
absolute and unqualified terms of the promise, that the promisor remains responsible for damages, notwithstanding the supervening impossibility. Switzer v. Pinconing Lumber Co., 59 Mich. 488, 26 N. W.
762. Ordinarily, impossibility of performance resulting from a contingency which might reasonably have been anticipated will not excuse performance of a contract as the contingency should have been
provided for, Mohaska County State Bank v. Brown. 159 Iowa 577, 144
N. W. 459; and when an obligor, from inevitable accident or irressistable force, cannot perform one of two things, either of which at the
time of his engagement he had the option to do, he is not relieved
from the obligation to perform the other. Jacquinet v. Boutron, 19 La.
Ann. 30. "This rule rests upon the substantial reason that, so long
as the contract is capable of performance in any mode contemplated
by the parties, its performance cannot be said to have become impossible." Bath Tp. Board of Education v. Townsend. 63 Ohio St.
514, 59, N. E. 223, 52 L. R. A. 868. But it is interesting to note that
"if one of the alternative things becomes impossible by the act of God,
or by the act or defaut of the obligee, or if by such conduct on his
part as amounts to a clearer waiver of its benefits the obligor becomes
excused from performing the others", Smith v. Durell, 16 N. H. 344,
41 Am. Dec. 732; and that "it is impossible to lay down any universal
proposition either way, but that the principle to be applied in each case
is that it must depend on the intention of the parties." Barkworth v.
Young, 4 Drew. I, IO, 62 English Reprints I. It is important in considering the application of the rule to be certain that the contract in
question is a true alternative contract and does not merely provide
for a penalty or liquidated damages in case the performance intended
as the real object of the contract is not rendered. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, sec. i96I, n. 9. In the instant case it seems that the contract
with the Indians was a true alternative contract. So far as the writer
could discover North Dakota has no cases in. point.
BENJAMIN ASHKANAZE.
-0-

EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF MATTER OBTAINED THROUGH UNLAWFUL SEARCH AND SELZURIS.-An appeal was made from a judgment
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of conviction for the unlawful possession of liquor, the grounds presented being that the warrant under which the search of the dwelling
house of the defendant was made was not of proper form, thus, void,
the evidence procured by such unlawful search being inadmissible.

Even though the state conceded that the search warrant was void,
held, the appeal disallowed. State v. Fahn, 52 N. D. 134, 205 N. W. 67.
In so holding, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota
followed the rule adopted in the majority of the state courts,
State v. Lacy, 212, N. W. 442 (N. D. 1927), but which is contrary to the Federal rule. The evidence admitted in this case

-was procured through a violation of

CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF

which provided that the rights of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be guaranteed. The reasons for
the rule as applied in the instant case are that even though the entry
of the officer be unlawful, still, when the evidence of the violation of
the law is before him, it would be an injustice to society not to use the
evidence merely because of the illegal actions of the one man. Furthermore, the rules of evidence are not meant to be an indirect process
of punishment, thus, to keep out the evidence procured through the
illegal entrance of the officer would delay, interrupt, and confuse the
court in disposing of the specific matter in hand; namely the punishment for the violation of the liquor laws. The decision in the instant
case is fully supported by Dean Wigmore in 3 WIGMORE ON EviDENCE, secs. 2175-2184. But the Federal rule is contra. It was first
enunciated in the case of Boyd v. the United States, 116 U. S. 616,
stating that evidence secured by a Federal officer without a proper
warrant is inadmissible as being in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. This rule is applied
and restated by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Byars
v. United States, decided January 3, 1927. In that case, upon a warrant issued by a judge of a state municipal court authorizing the search
of the premises of the defendant for the unlawful possession of liquor,
the local officer of the Des Moines, Iowa, Police Station invited a
Federal agent, one Mr. Adams to accompany him on the search.
Mr. Adams consented, and personally found in one of the rooms of
the defendant a collection of counterfeit strip stamps of the kind
used upon whiskey bottled in bond. The decision of the court ordered
a return of the evidence to the defendant on the theory that, the
evidence procured through the violation of the Fourth Amendment,
its retention would amount to a recognition given by the court to the
fruits of an action performed by a Federal officer in violation of the
Constitution of the United States. The court makes it clear that the
Federal rule guards watchfully against any stealthy encroachment upon
the constitutional provisions providing for the security of person and
property.
See 0. H. Thormodsgard, The Agnello Case and the
Seasonable Demand Rule, I DAK. L. REv. I (1927).
JALMAR 0. MUUS.
NORTH DAKOTA, SEC. I8,

NEGLIGENCE-LAST CLEAR CHANCE.-In an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the driver of a truck in a
collision with a railway train at a crossing, where it appeared that the
view of one approaching the crossing for a distance of 6oo feet was
unobstructed, and was such as to enable one to see an approaching train
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anywhere on the track within approximately 2000 feet of the crossing,
and where the only obstruction of the driver's vision was afforded by
the top over the seat of the truck and sloping side curtains, and where
such driver approached the crossing without stopping or looking to
ascertain the approach of a train, it was shown that the fireman
on the train saw the truck approach the tracks, and gave such information to the engineer, that said engineer thereupon applied the brakes,
but released them again when told that the truck had stopped. Engineer tried to stop train when 150 feet from crossing on fireman telling
him that truck had been started again. This was, however, too late
to avoid the injury. Held, that truck driver was guilty of contributory negligence which precludes recovery; and that under the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Last Clear Chance doctrine would not
apply. State ex. rel. North Dakota iWorkmen's Compensation Board
v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 2o9 N. W. 853 (N. Dak., 1926).
While the negligent act or omission of the person injured ordin 7.
•arily defeats recovery, the rule is subject to the exception or qualification, that although such person has been guilty of negligence in exposing himself to danger, yet he may recover if the defendant, after
knowing of such danger could have avoided the injury by the exercise of ordinary care and fails to do so. Keefe v. Chicago and N. W.
Ry. Co., 92 Iowa 182, 6o N. W. 503; Dailey v. Burlington and M. Ry.
Co., 58 Nebr. 396, 78 N. W. 722. The rule stated above is universally
adopted where defendant knows, becomes aware of or discovers the
peril of the person injured in time to avoid the injury. Harlan v.
St. Louis and N. Ry. Co., 65 Mo. 22. In some jurisdictions however,
the principle upon which the doctrine of discovered peril is based, has
no application in the absence of actual knowledge, on the part of the
person causing the injury, of the peril of the person injured in time
to prevent the injury by the use of means within his reach. St. Louis
Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Cochran, 77 Ark. 398, 91 S. W. 747; Arnold
v. Ft. Dodge Ry. Co., (Iowa)

173 N. W. 252.

In others, however,

the doctrine has been extended to cases where the defendant might
have discovered the peril by the exercise of reasonable care. Louisville and N. Ry. Co. v. Hirey, (Ky.) 29 S. W. 869; Sites v. Knott,
197 Mo. 684, 96 S. W. 2o6; Guentha v. St. Louis Ry. Co., io8 Mo. 18,
18 S. W. 846. In some jurisdictions; this doctrine, as regards railroad companies, has been held to apply also where the accident occurs
at a point where the railroad company has a reason to apprehend that
persons may be on or near the tracks, and therefore where it might
have discovered the injured party and by the exercise of ordinary
care prevented the injury. Blankenship v. Chesapeake and 0. Ry Co.,
94 Va. 449, 27 S. E. 2o. By what appears to be the weight of
authority the doctrine applies only where the defendant has actual
knowledge of the injured party's peril, in time to avert the accident,
by the exercise of ordinary care. 38 Cyc. 456; 29 Cyc. 530; 37 Cent.
Dig. tit. Negligence, sec. II5; 2o R. C. L. sec. 116, Negligence;
citing numerous cases involving the doctrine of last clear chance.
ALFRED G. TEXLEY.
-0

TORTS - MASTER

AND

SERVANT - DEVIATION

BY

SERVANT

FROM

ROUTE.-An electrical contractor sent his servant in a runabout on a
long trip across the state, supplying him with a map and prescribing
the route and major halts. Servant deviated from the prescribed
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route the first day to make a private visit at a place 18 miles off the
route. The visit completed, servant started back by a direct (but
different) route to the 'place designated for the first night's halt.
Darkness fell, and through fault the servant collided with a team
and buggy, injuring the driver, who brought suit against the master
for injuries. The case was tried to a jury below, but dismissed by
the court on motion by the defense, on the ground, principally, that
plaintiff had failed to establish liability in the master as a matter
of law. On appeal, held, that the question whether servant's deviation from the prescribed route was such abaiidonment of the master's
service as to exonerate the master from liability is one of fact for a
jury, under proper instructions, and not one of law to be decided
by the court. Kohlman v.Hyland, 21o N. W. 643 (N. D., 1926).
The court establishes the North Dakota general rule of evidence
to be as follows: "In order to establish the liability of a master to
a third person, to whom he owes no contractual duty, for the
negligent act of his servant, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove,
by a fair preponderance of the evidence, that the tort-feaser was a
servant of the master working under his control, when the injury
was sustained, and that the negligent act was done within the course
of the employment." When a seryant temporarily abandons his
master's business and pursues an adventure of his own, the master is
not liable for the tortious acts of the servant while so engaged on
his private purposes. Provo v. Conrad, 130 Minn. 412, 153 N. W.
753, 2 MEECHAM ON AGENCY, sec. i88o. In the case of a servant
driving his master's automobile on an enterprise assigned by, and
along a route prescribed by, the master, a deviation from the prescribed route may be so clearly and incontrovertibly an abandonment
of the master's business that the court must rule as a matter of law
that the master is exonerated from liability for the tortious acts of
the servant during the deviation. Slater v. Advance Thresher Company, 97 Minn. 305, to7 N. W. 133, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 598.

On the

other hand, the deviation may be so slight that reasonable men might
well reach differing conclusions as to whether the master's business
is to be considered as abandoned. Dockwciler v. American Piano
Company, 94 Misc. Rep. 712, i6o N. Y. S. 270. There is, says the
court in the main case, a certain indefinite "permissible zone of
deviation"-"an area beyond and around the place within which the
strict terms of the employment require the servant to remain, into
which common experience with and observation of human nature.
suggest that he will, as inclination dictates, probably go." In accordance with the philosophy underlying the Master's Liability rule and
the related Workmen's Compensation Acts, the burden of this risk
should be borne by the master. The court cites Eaken's Adm's. v.
Anderson, 169 Ky. I, 183 S. W. 217, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1003.

See

also SHERMAN AND REDFIELD ON NEGLIGENCE, (6th ed.) sec. 147.
A troublesome question is one which arises in the main case, viz;
When a servant has deviated to a considerable extent (I8 miles)
from the route of travel prescribed by the master, has accomplished
his private object at the end of the deviation, and starts back to
resume the prescribed route, assuming that the deviation amounts to
a temporary abandonment of his master's business, when does he
resume his master's business-when he starts back, or when he gets
back, to the prescribed route? There is a marked variance in decisions
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on this

point.

North

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

Dakota

has no

rule.

But see article

23

444, 716, on Frolic and Detour; Riley v.

Standard Oil Company, 231 N. Y. 301, 132 N. E. 97, 22 A. L. R. 1382
holds that the servant has resumed the master's business when he
starts back, even though he may choose a different route. HUDDY ON
AUTOMOBILES, (7th ed.) sec. 753, states contra, as holds also Dockweiler v. American Piano Company, 94 Misc. Rep. 712, 16o N. Y. S.
270. For these reasons (I) that there is a certain "permissible"
zone of deviation, as to the extent of which in any case reasonable
men may differ; and (2) that there is a reasonable question as to
whether the servant should be considered to have resumed the master's
business when he started from the end of his deviation back in the
general direction that his prescribed route takes, or not until he again
reached the prescribed route - the court held in the main case that
the question whether the servant's deviation from the prescribed
route was a sufficient abandonment of the master's business to
exonerate the master from liability should have been left as a question of fact to the jury, and not decided as a question of law by the
court.
ARTHUR L. HAUGAN.
-0

-

TRUSTS - EXPRESS TRUST - DELIVERY

FOR SAFE

KEEPING.-This

is

an action to recover the proceeds of a promissory note alleged to
have been delivered to plaintiff in such a way as to constitute an
express trust. The note in question was given by D. Breneman and
Emma Breneman to order of Hattie Stout for $I,O9O.OO and interest
at seven per cent. Hattie Stout then delivered the note to F. A.
Kelley for safe keeping with a provision that in the event of sickness
or death he was to pay the necessary expenses and keep the proceeds
without any probate court or legal proceedings. Held, that under the
facts narrated it was not error for the court to find that no express
trust had been created. Kelley v. Norton, 249 Pac. 6o8 (Kan., 1921).
Express trust implies the cooperation of three persons, the
settlor who establishes the trust, a trustee or person who takes and
holds the legal title of the trust property for the benefits of another,
and the cestui que trust for whose benefit the trust is created. 39
Cyc. 35; Section 6274, COMPILED LAWS N. Dak. (913).
But, express trusts are created by stated intent of the settlor that they shall
exist accompanied by necessary disposition of trust property. BOGERT
ON TRUST, 43.
Parol evidence is inadmissible to establish an express
trust, Harbour v. Harbour, 146 S. W. 867 (Ark., 1912). However,
parol evidence is admissible to make clear the details of the trust,
the existence of which is in writing, Fox v. Fox, 95 N. E. 498 (Ill.,
1911). In the present case when the trust was not sufficiently declared on its face it cannot be set up by extrinsic evidence to defeat
the heirs at law or the next of kin, Minot v. Attorney General, 75
N. E. 149 (Mass., 1905). Words "received from Hattie Stout for
safe keeping" would have been sufficient if it was the intention of
the settlor to create a trust. See 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 483. But
words in a request, in their ordinary meaning, convey a mere request
and do not convey a legal obligation of any kind either at law or in
equity. Hill v. Hill, (1879) I Q. 8. 271.
In the present case there was no separation of the legal from the
equitable title; no trust can exist where the same person possesses
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both. When the legal title, and the equitable title come together in
the same person the equitable title is merged into the legal and the
trust is terminated. Doan v. Parrish of Ascension, 103 Md. 662
(Md., 1915).
JOHN K. MA CDONALD.
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